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Abstract
It is widely argued that declining fertility slows the pace of economic
growth through its negative eect on labor supply. There are, how-
ever, theoretical arguments suggesting that the eect of falling fertility
on eective labor supply can be oset by the associated behavioral
changes. We formalize these arguments by setting forth a dynamic
consumer optimization model that incorporates endogenous fertility
as well as endogenous educational and health investments. The model
shows that a fertility decline induces higher education and health in-
vestments that are able to compensate for declining fertility under
certain circumstances. We assess the theoretical implications by inves-
tigating panel data for 118 countries over the period 1980 to 2005 and
show that behavioral changes partly mitigate the negative impact of
declining fertility on eective labor supply.
JEL classication: I15, I25, J24, O47
Keywords: demographic change, eective labor supply, human capi-
tal, population health, economic growth
11 Introduction
Declining fertility is among the most salient features of global demography.
The global total fertility rate (TFR) fell from 5 children per woman in 1950
to 2.5 in 2011, and United Nations (2011) project a further drop to 2.2 by
2050. In industrialized countries the TFR already reached far lower levels.
For example, Strulik et al. (2011) show that all G-8 countries had to face
below-replacement fertility in 2005 | the updated gures for 2011 are dis-
played in Table 1 | and Herzer et al. (2010) argue that there is barely any
sign that these rates will recover again in the near future. This develop-
ment will have a pronounced impact on the workforce of the corresponding
countries. While the baby booms caused by increased fertility after World
War II resulted in large cohorts entering the labor market in the 1960s and
1970s, these workers are now moving toward the 60+ age range and starting
to retire. Consequently, a substantial decline in the working age population
can be expected to prevail in the next two decades.
Table 1: TFR for the G-8 countries in 2011
USA 2.08 France 1.99
U.K. 1.87 Canada 1.69
Russia 1.51 Italy 1.45
Germany 1.42 Japan 1.38
Some \alarmist" concerns have been articulated by various public in-
tellectuals on the consequences of these demographic developments. For
example, Peterson (1999) describes global aging as a \threat more grave
and certain than those posed by chemical weapons, nuclear proliferation,
or ethnic strife". Others have expressed concerns in more measured terms.
The World Economic Forum (2004) suggests that with increasing numbers
of non-working elderly, \we face the prospect that the historical rates of im-
provement in standards of living might slow or even decline." Furthermore,
in the last two years \The Economist" has devoted three special reports to
demographic change and its economic consequences which | in monetary
terms | are expected to dwarf the burden associated with the current eco-
nomic and nancial crisis (The Economist, 2009, 2011a,b). All these exam-
ples point toward the topic's high prole in the public debate, emphasizing
2the need for a detailed economic investigation.
In recent years, economists have begun to devote greater attention to
the implications of population aging in general and declining fertility in
particular. One major concern is that when larger and older cohorts retire,
while smaller and younger cohorts enter the labor market, the support ratio
will decline and fewer and fewer workers will have to produce the output
which is consumed by all the individuals in the economy. This scenario
is often referred to as the \accounting eect" of demographic change (see
for example Gruescu, 2007; Bloom et al., 2010). Another concern has to
do with the scal integrity of pay-as-you-go pensions and social security
systems in general (cf. Gruber and Wise, 1998; Gertler, 1999; Bloom et al.,
2007). Yet another concern has to do with future asset values insofar as
the elderly liquidate their assets to nance their consumption in old age (cf.
B orsch-Suppan and Ludwig, 2009).
Do economists share these concerns? In general, yes, but their verdict is
much less alarmist. That is because economists also take into account the
fact that changing demographics will catalyze various behavioral changes
that will ameliorate the negative economic eects of declining fertility. For
example, female labor force participation rates are expected to rise in re-
sponse to low fertility (cf. Bloom et al., 2009) and savings rates may increase
in response to longer anticipated periods of retirement (cf. Bloom et al.,
2007). These aspects have been referred to as the \behavioral eects" of
demographic change.
In this paper we are particularly interested in the impact of declining
fertility on an economy's aggregate human capital stock. The reason is that
its supply is decisive for long-run economic development in the context of
research and development (R&D) based economic growth theory (see for
example Romer, 1990; Aghion and Howitt, 1992; Jones, 1995; Segerstr om,
1998). This strand of research emphasizes the need of having either a large
population size or fast population growth to avoid economic stagnation in
the long run.
Specically, the argument runs as follows. Assume (i) that eective
labor input is a simple compound of the number of workers times their
human capital, H = L  h, (ii) that a constant fraction  of aggregate
labor is allocated to R&D, (iii) that aggregate output is produced via a
Cobb-Douglas technology from eective labor and capital given factor pro-
3ductivity A, Y = K[A(1   )H]1 , and (iv) that advances of factor
productivity are produced by R&D via another Cobb-Douglas technology,
_ A = AH  H. Then, ceteris paribus, declining fertility leads to lower
economic growth because it reduces the number of workers L and thus the
eective labor input in R&D. The claim can easily be veried by dierenti-
ating aggregate production with respect to time, imposing the steady-state
condition _ Y =Y = _ H=H = _ K=K, and inserting R&D output, which provides
_ Y =Y = A 1(hL).1
In the conclusion we briey discuss the assumptions under which the
result is derived. In the main text, we do not question the assumptions
but the meaningfulness of the ceteris paribus condition. We argue that, at
the micro-level, there is a child quantity-quality tradeo at work, implying
that declining fertility goes hand in hand with increasing human capital
endowment per person in terms of education and health. With the tradeo
operative, declining fertility does not only imply a smaller workforce L in
the next generation but also a higher quality endowment h per worker. It is
thus a priori unclear whether eective labor input and thus economic growth
(according to the conventional theory) declines or not.
The child quantity-quality channel constitutes one potential explanation
of why empirical studies so far have failed to corroborate the pessimistic
prediction from conventional growth theory, instead supporting a negative
association between economic growth and population growth (see for exam-
ple Brander and Dowrick, 1994; Kelley and Schmidt, 1995; Ahituv, 2001;
Bernanke and G urkaynak, 2001). As a consequence, there has been a grow-
ing literature trying to reconcile the theoretical predictions with empirical
evidence by showing that there exist mechanisms that could avert the neg-
ative economic impact of decreasing fertility (see for example Dalgaard and
Kreiner, 2001; Strulik, 2005; Strulik et al., 2011). These models build upon
the crucial insight already expressed in Lucas (1988) and Mankiw et al.
(1992) and further analyzed for example by Lee and Mason (2010) that it
is not the sheer size of the labor force that matters for economic prosperity
but also its quality as represented by the average level of education.
A similar argument could also be made about another dimension of hu-
man capital that is often neglected in this context | namely, personal health
1See Prettner and Prskawetz (2010) for an overview on the demographic aspects of
selected R&D based growth models.
4(see for example Bloom and Canning, 2000; Shastry and Weil, 2003; Weil,
2007; Ashraf et al., 2008; Lee and Mason, 2010). If individuals divert re-
sources they would have spent on raising children to investments in their
own health, it could increase their productivity and thus the aggregate ef-
fective labor supply. In our paper we aim to extend the notion of human
capital in the growth literature to include this important dimension. Thus,
we are concerned with the question whether the relative decrease of the
eective labor force expected owing to fertility decreases can be mitigated
by the associated behavioral change toward higher investments in children's
education and own health.
To investigate this issue, we set up a standard overlapping generations
model augmented by a fertility decision and child quality-quantity tradeo
as described in Becker (1993). In this framework we introduce endogenous
investments into adult health. Educational and health investments translate
into individual labor productivity along the lines of Mincer (1974). Our cen-
tral result is that decreasing fertility corresponds with an increasing eective
labor force if the associated larger investments into education for children
and adult health aect individual human capital suciently strongly |
that is, if the corresponding behavioral changes toward a higher-quality la-
bor force are able to overcompensate for the negative eect toward its lower
quantity.2
We then empirically assess the presence of the outlined mechanism from
a macroeconomic perspective and test whether the conditions for the posi-
tive impact of declining fertility on aggregate human capital are met. Our
results indicate that the quality-quantity tradeo is present with respect
to both quality dimensions: education and health. Furthermore, we show
that the theoretically outlined quality-quantity tradeo mechanism ensures
that parts of the negative economic consequences of declining fertility are
averted. Nevertheless, the quantity-quality substitution alone appears to be
too weak to completely overturn the negative impact of declining fertility
on the aggregate human capital.
The paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 sets up the model and moti-
vates the central mechanism on which we base our empirical investigations.
2Facing below-replacement fertility indenitely would, of course, imply that the aggre-
gate labor force converges toward zero. We thus do not claim that our model is an accurate
description in such an extreme setting but that it represents a reasonable approximation
of future developments in the medium run.
5Section 3 presents our empirical strategy and the results. Finally, Section 4
discusses these results and their implications.
2 Theoretical Foundation
Consider an economy in which adult individuals live for two periods. In
the rst period they supply their skills on the labor market and choose
consumption, savings for retirement, investments into their health, fertility
(quantity), and education (quality) of their children to maximize their life-
time utility. In the second period they consume the proceeds of their savings
and expire. The lifetime utility experienced by an individual born at time t
is given by the logarithmic function
u = log(ct) +  log(Rt+1st) +  log(nt) +  log(et) + log(pt); (1)
where ct refers to consumption in period t, 1 >  > 0 is the discount factor,
Rt+1 is the gross interest rate between period t and period t+1, st are savings
carried over from period t to period t + 1 such that the composite Rt+1st
denotes consumption in period t + 1,  > 0 is the weight of the number of
children nt in utility, and  > 0 is the weight for education per child et.
Finally,  denotes the weight an individual puts on her own physical health,
which is itself assumed to depend positively on health spending pt.3
Following Galor and Weil (2000), the costs of investments into the quan-
tity of children are modeled as foregone wages, while the costs of investments
into their quality are modeled as linearly increasing in education. This im-
plies that the budget constraint of an individual reads
wt (1   nt) = ct + st + etnt + pt; (2)
where  > 0 represents the xed costs of each child and wt is the wage
that an individual could earn if she supplies her whole available time on
the labor market. This equation states that total lifetime income has to be
equal to total lifetime expenditure on utility generating activities and goods.
The individual can therefore spend her income in period t on consumption,
3In this discrete time overlapping generations formulation, the appropriate interpreta-
tion is that health spending reduces morbidity. It does not matter qualitatively whether
there is a positive utility eect of health spending itself or a negative utility eect of
morbidity.
6savings, health, bringing up uneducated children (quantity) and investing
in the human capital of each child (quality).
This setup represents a simple and intuitive way to motivate the central
mechanism we want to assess. For the sake of tractability, our modeling
abstracts from issues like i) an explicit treatment of the governmental sec-
tor4, ii) investments in own education and investments in children's health
although we acknowledge that these represent other important channels (cf.
Cunha and Heckman, 2009; Dalgaard and Strulik, 2011); iii) anticipated
feedback eects between health and wages to keep the model solvable, iv)
all types of matching issues, v) indivisibility of the number of children, and
vi) heterogeneity of households.
The solution to the optimization problem is represented by the following
set of expressions for optimal consumption ct, saving st, health expenditure
pt, education et and fertility nt:
ct =
wt
















( +  +  + 1)
: (7)
These results require the weight of the number of children in utility to
exceed the weight of education, i.e.,  > , otherwise parents would prefer
to have no children at all and we would end up with a degenerate corner
solution. We restrict our attention to the economically meaningful interior
solution and assume that  >  holds. Inspecting the optimal solution we
arrive at the following comparative static results.
Remark 1. If individuals put more weight on the number of children in
utility, they increase fertility and reduce consumption, savings, health in-
vestments, and education of their children.
4The results would be qualitatively similar if the government provides health and edu-
cation and nances the related expenditures via taxes. The introduction of a government
run pay-as-you-go pension system would mainly lead to a crowding out of private savings,
an eect that is not a focus of our study.
7Proof. By investigating equations (3), (4), (5) and (6), we immediately see
that a higher  means lower consumption, savings, and health and educa-
tional investments. To see the eect on fertility, we take the derivative of nt




 +  +  + 1
( +  +  + 1)2
; (8)
which is unambiguously positive.
Remark 2. If individuals put more weight on education in utility, they re-
duce fertility, increase educational investments, and hold consumption, sav-
ings and health investments constant.
Proof. Obvious from inspecting equations (3) { (7) for higher .
Remarks 1 and 2 reect the well-known child quantity-quality tradeo as
described in Becker (1993). If parents want better educated children, they
decrease fertility and increase education, while the converse holds true if they
want more children. Furthermore, we summarize the eects of increasing
health investments in the following remark.
Remark 3. If individuals put more weight on health in utility, they reduce
consumption, savings and fertility, increase health investments, and hold
educational investments constant.
Proof. By investigating equations (3), (4), (6) and (7) for higher  we imme-
diately see that educational investments are not aected and that consump-
tion, savings and fertility decrease. To see the eect on health investments




( +  + 1)wt
( +  +  + 1)2; (9)
which is unambiguously positive.
Altogether we see that there is a crucial tradeo between educational
investments and health investments on the one hand and the number of
children on the other hand. The former two can also be regarded as invest-
ments in labor quality (that is, the productivity of individuals), while the
latter can be regarded as an investment in the labor quantity (that is, the
number of individuals). The crucial question we have to address is how this
8tradeo on the micro level aects eective labor supply on the macro level.
In so doing we assume that investments in children translate into eective
years of schooling, denoted as ~ et+1, according to




where  is the productivity of the education sector. We divide by wages to
control for a general increase in schooling costs which are assumed to rise
with wages | that is, the renumeration of professors and teachers. By the
same token we assume that the health sector produces individual physical
health (an inverse measure of morbidity), denoted as ~ pt, according to




where  refers to the productivity of the health sector and we again control
for an increase in prices over time as approximated by the wages of doctors
and nurses.
We next assume consistent with Mincer (1974) and following Hall and
Jones (1999), Bils and Klenow (2000), Caselli (2005), and Bloom and Can-
ning (2005) that human capital of an individual | that is, its productivity,
which we denote by ht | can be described according to
ht = expf(~ et 1) +  (~ pt)g; (12)
where  and   with the properties 0(~ et 1) > 0 and  0(~ pt) > 0 are functions
relating individual human capital to years of schooling and health status.
The extent to which more education and better health matters for pro-
ductivity depends upon the functions  and  . We follow the conventional
assumption in the literature (e.g. Mankiw et al., 1992) and regard the num-
ber of individuals multiplied by their individual human capital endowment
as eective labor force. Let population size in period t   1 be denoted by



















9Note that the conventional notion of eective labor implies that quantity (as
represented by the population size) and quality (as represented by individual
human capital) can be substituted one for one.
We next state our central results regarding the association of demo-
graphic change and eective labor supply.
Proposition 1. A declining population originating from a lower weight of
the number of children in utility is associated with an increasing eective
labor force in the next period if the induced quality enhancing investments
into education and health dominate the negative quantity eect.
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
(1 +  +  + )2

: (14)
The expression is negative if the quantity eect (the rst term) is dominated
by the quality eect (the second term).
The economic intuition for this outcome is as follows. If parents want
to have fewer children, they reduce their fertility, which directly increases
spending on all other components that enter their utility function. In addi-
tion, parents spend less time on rearing children and more time supplying
labor on the market and earning an income. Part of the additional income is
spent on education and health. If eective years of schooling or health status
or both have a large impact on individual human capital, then the negative
eects of decreasing fertility on eective labor supply are overcompensated
by the positive eects of increasing educational and/or health investments
on individual productivity.
Formally, an overcompensation occurs if 0 (~ et 1) or  0 (~ pt) or both are
large, which is the case if changes in education ~ et 1 or changes in health ~ pt
or changes in both have a large impact upon individual human capital. If,
by contrast, education and health have only a small impact on individual
human capital, then the negative eect of decreasing fertility dominates and
the eective labor force declines.
Analogously, we obtain the following result.
10Proposition 2. A declining population originating from a higher weight of
education in utility is associated with an increasing eective labor force in
the next period if the induced quality enhancing investments into education
dominate the negative quantity eect.
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(   ) + 
(   )2 0 (~ et 1); (15)
which is positive if the quantity eect (the rst term) is dominated by the
quality eect (the second term).
Intuitively, if parents want to have better educated children, they in-
crease educational investments and reduce fertility. The reduced fertility
frees time and raises labor supply and income, which is spent on the edu-
cation of children. The eect on education is particularly strong because
parents do not want to spend the additional income on consumption or sav-
ings (see Remark 2). Formally, if education has a suciently large impact
on individual human capital, that is, if 0 (~ et 1) is suciently high, the posi-
tive education eect overcompensates the negative fertility eect on eective
labor supply.
Finally, we state the third observation regarding the preference for health.
Proposition 3. A declining population originating from a higher weight of
adult health in utility is associated with an increasing eective labor force
in the next period if the induced quality enhancing investments into health
dominate the negative quantity eect.
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(1 +  + )
(1 +  +  + )2  0 (~ pt): (16)
11The expression is positive if the quantity eect (the rst term) is dominated
by the quality eect (the second term).
The economic intuition for this result is that a higher preference for
health  raises health investments and reduces fertility. Again, less time
spent on child-rearing and more labor supply provides more income which is
spent on health. Moreover, the individuals reduce consumption and savings
to nance additional health investments. If the impact of health status on
human capital is suciently strong | that is, if  0 (~ pt) is suciently large,
the positive eect on eective labor supply dominates.
3 Empirical Assessment
Given the theoretical ambiguity, it is an interesting empirical question how
large the mitigating impact of education and health on eective labor sup-
ply is and whether it is suciently large to overcompensate the eect of a
declining population. From a micro perspective there is an ongoing debate
about the existence of a quality-quantity tradeo and it's causal direction
(see Black et al., 2005; Rosenzweig and Zhang, 2009; Angrist et al., 2010,
for dierent views). From the macro perspective, however, we are only in-
terested in solving the much easier problem of determining the association
between fertility and human capital. Specically we are interested in a) the
association between fertility on the one hand and average education and
health status of the population on the other hand and b) the association
between fertility and eective labor supply.
We test whether the quantity-quality tradeo is observable at the macro
level by running regressions of the following form
Ei;t = 1 + 2bi;t + 3 logyi;t 1 + 4 logLi;t 1 + 5Pi;t 1 + i + t + ui;t;
Pi;t = 6 + 7bi;t + 8 logyi;t 1 + 9 logLi;t 1 + 10Ei;t 1 + i + t + ui;t;
(17)
where i represents the cross country dimension, t the time dimension, j for
j = 1;:::;10 refers to the parameters to be estimated, E denotes average
years of schooling of the population aged 15+ as an indicator for education,
b refers to the crude birth rate as an indicator for fertility, y is PPP adjusted
per capita GDP in 2005 international Dollars to control for dierences in
12living standards, L stands for he population size to account for the possibility
that in a larger economy there could be more spare resources for schooling
and health care in case that fertility declines (which we do not want to
capture with the coecient estimate of the birth rate), and P refers to
life expectancy at birth as a conservative indicator for population health.
The reason for it being conservative is that, owing to the compression of
morbidity hypothesis (cf. Fries, 1980; Mathers et al., 2001; Mor, 2005), we
expect overall health to increase more strongly than life expectancy. We
control for country specic xed eects i and time specic xed eects t,
while ui;t represents the error term assumed to have mean zero. In these
equations 2 < 0 and 7 < 0 would indicate the presence of a quality-quantity
tradeo eect for education and health, respectively.
In order to estimate the parameters of the regression equations we make
use of data obtained from World Bank (2011)'s \World Development In-
dicators & Global Development Finance" database, except for the educa-
tion proxy, which stems from the \Education Statistics" database and has
originally been compiled by the International Institute for Applied Systems
Analysis (IIASA) and the Vienna Institute of Demography (VID) (cf. Lutz
et al., 2007). The data cover the time period 1980-2005 in ve-year steps
for 118 countries (see Appendix A for a detailed list).
Table 2 contains the coecient estimates for xed eects estimation.
The xed eects estimator is preferred because relative to OLS, it controls
for country-specic characteristics and hence reduces the likelihood of an
omitted variable bias, while equality of coecient estimates between the
xed eects and the random eects (RE) estimator has been rejected by
a Hausman test implying that the coecient estimates obtained by RE
estimation are biased.5 With time xed eects we try to control for the
impact of underlying trends that aect all countries in a similar manner.
We obtain negative estimates of the coecients on fertility in the regres-
sions for education (2) and for health (7). The estimates are signicant
at the 5% level with the point estimate of 7 being larger in absolute value
than the point estimate of 2. This means that a quality-quantity trade-
o as described by our theoretical model is observable at the macro level.
5The results of the OLS and RE estimators were qualitatively in line with those of
the FE estimator. Furthermore, note that we do not need to apply a system estimation
procedure because we use lagged values of education and health in order to explain the
respective other variable.
13In particular, the quality-quantity tradeo does not only operate via the
education channel but also via the health channel.
Table 2: The Quantity-Quality Trade-o at the Macro-Level
education (17) health (17)
fertility (bt) -0.023 -0.276
(0.010)** (0.111)**
income (logyt 1) 0.221 1.727
(0.103)** (0.785)**








country fe yes yes
time fe yes yes
Standard errors are reported below the coecient estimates in parenthesis. One asterisk
indicates signicance at the 10% level, two asterisks indicate signicance at the 5% level
and three asterisks indicate signicance at the 1% level. OBS refers to the number of
observations.
To analyze part b) namely the question whether the quality-quantity
tradeo mitigates the negative impact of decreasing fertility on eective
labor supply, we recall that eective labor is given by Ht = htntLt 1 such
that by taking the total derivative and noting that the lagged population







This equation states that the overall change in eective labor supply induced
by a change in fertility can be decomposed into a pure quantity eect (the
rst term on the right hand side) and a quality eect (the second term).
The quantity eect simply measures the impact of a change in fertility on
eective labor supply for given individual human capital, while the quality
14eect measures the impact of the associated change of education and health
status.
To evaluate the interaction of the quantity and quality eect we compute







and t the following regression:
loghi;t = 11 + 12 logbi;t + 13 logyi;t 1 + 14 logLi;t 1 + i + t + ui;t:
(20)
The coecient 12 provides our estimate of h. A negative value would
indicate that the quality eect mitigates the quantity eect on eective labor
supply and a value lower than -1 would indicate that it overcompensates the
quantity eect.
The rst step in solving the problem is to specify the properties of 
and   to compute human capital h from the education and health data.
Given the uncertainty about the true values of the return on education
and the return on health we begin by dening two benchmark cases and
then provide robustness checks. Our rst case follows Bloom and Canning
(2005), who, based upon Psacharopoulos (1994), Bils and Klenow (2000)
and Weil (2007), set  = 0:091 and   = 0:0168. In a second case we further
distinguish between average years of primary (prim), secondary (sec), and
tertiary (tert) education levels according to Hall and Jones (1999). We
obtain the data regarding these measures from Barro and Lee (2010). In
this case (~ et 1) becomes a piecewise linear function dened as
(~ et 1) = 0:134 primt 1 + 0:101 sect 1 + 0:068 tertt 1 (21)
and we still construct human capital by including the return on health along
the lines of Bloom and Canning (2005).
Results for xed eects estimation of equation (20) are shown in Table
3. The point estimate for the elasticity of human capital (12) is -0.106 and
-0.207, respectively. In both cases the 95% condence interval excludes 0 as
well as -1. Hence, the hypothesis that the quantity-quality tradeo is a force
strong enough to overcompensate the negative impact of declining fertility
15on eective labor supply is rejected. On the other hand, our estimate also
documents that a considerable portion of the negative eect is mitigated by
the associated behavioral changes.
Table 3: Fertility and Eective Labor Supply
human capital (loght) human capital (loght)
(1) (2)
fertility (logbt) -0.106 -0.207
(0.038)*** (0.054)***
income (logyt 1) 0.045 0.020
(0.016)*** (0.017)




country fe yes yes
time fe yes yes
Estimates of equation (20). Case (1) computes human capital following the approach of
Bloom and Canning (2005). Case (2) follows Hall and Jones (1999). Standard errors are
reported in parenthesis. One asterisk indicates signicance at the 10% level, two asterisks
indicate signicance at the 5% level and three asterisks indicate signicance at the 1%
level. OBS refers to the number of observations.
We applied a number of robustness checks that in general conrm our
results. We have dropped lagged income and population and obtained vir-
tually the same estimate of h, indicating that endogeneity bias is not a
substantial concern. We then assessed the sensitivity of the parameter es-
timate for the human capital elasticity 12 with respect to changes in the
return to education  and the return to health   in the benchmark case fol-
lowing Bloom and Canning (2005). We did this by assuming an upper bound
of  = 0:15 and   = 0:02 and a lower bound of  = 0:06 and   = 0:011
such that the case of  = 0:091 and   = 0:0168 used by Bloom and Canning
(2005) represents an intermediate variant. The results of the parameter es-
timate for 12 and the associated 95% condence intervals are displayed in
Figure 1. Naturally, the estimate of the human capital elasticity rises when
the assumed return on schooling gets bigger. For all parameterizations, the
condence interval excludes 0 and -1, meaning that the quality eect partly
16mitigates the quantity eect on eective labor supply.









0.02  0.019  0.018  0.017  0.016  0.015  0.014  0.013  0.012  0.011 














































Point estimates (squares) and associated 95% condence intervals (crosses) of the
human capital elasticity of fertility (h) for the dierent combinations of  and  
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For other robustness checks we used the logarithm of the lagged crude
birth rate instead of the logarithm of the birth rate as regressor, which
slightly aects the estimate of the human capital elasticity without qualita-
tively aecting the results. Next we split the sample into OECD countries
and non-OECD countries. The point estimates for h remain negative for
both groups of countries and the 95% condence interval excludes -1. The
estimate is larger in absolute terms for non-OECD countries and it is in-
signicantly dierent from zero for the OECD countries in the bechmark case
of human capital following Bloom and Canning (2005), presumably also be-
cause of the smaller sample size. Finally, instead of using the IIASA/VID
data regarding the mean years of schooling for the population aged 15+, we
17also ran the regressions with Barro and Lee (2010)'s dataset. We obtain a
somewhat higher absolute value of the elasticity but, again, the qualitative
results remain unaected.6
In a related study Lee and Mason (2010) nd a much higher human cap-
ital elasticity of fertility. Measuring human capital by child expenditures for
education and health as a fraction of adult wages, they obtain an elasticity
with respect to the total fertility rate of -1.05. This value would indeed
imply a (mild) overcompensation of the quantity eect by the quality eect.
A part of the dierence between their result and ours has to do with the
estimation method: while Lee and Mason (2010) apply a cross section regres-
sion, we make use of a panel dataset, where we also control for country- and
time-specic xed eects, lagged per capita GDP and the lagged population
size. If we drop all xed eects and control variables from our regression,
the absolute value of the parameter estimate for the elasticity of individual
human capital with respect to the birth rate increases by a factor of 6.
Conceptually, our Mincerian approach, based solely on mean years of
schooling and life expectancy, fails to take into account other important
determinants of the quality of human capital like teacher quality and pupil-
teacher ratios. These factors enter into Lee and Mason (2010)'s estimate
at least approximately through child expenditures for education and health.
Taken together the methodological and conceptual dierences of the two
studies lead us to conjecture that the \true" human capital elasticity of
fertility probably lies between these two benchmark estimates.
4 Discussion
In this paper we argue that the quantity-quality tradeo constitutes an im-
portant mechanism counteracting the negative impact of fertility decline
on aggregate eective labor supply. Putting the theory to the test on the
macro level we found that the quantity-quality tradeo indeed represents
a statistically signicant and economically important force that mitigates
the negative impact of demographic change. But we also found that, taken
for itself, the quantity-quality tradeo is not strong enough to overturn the
negative eects of decreasing fertility on eective labor supply. In reality,
however, the quantity-quality tradeo is complemented and potentially am-
6The results of the robustness checks can be found in Appendix B.
18plied by other accounting and behavioral eects like the decline in the youth
dependency ratio and therefore the emergence of a demographic dividend
(cf. Bloom et al., 2003, 2010), the positive response of female labor force
participation to low fertility (cf. Bloom et al., 2009), and the productivity
increase of human capital owing to physical capital deepening in the wake
of declining or even negative population growth (cf. Solow, 1956; Gruescu,
2007).
For a conclusion on the economic perspectives in the very long run,
however, it is important to note that the quantity-quality tradeo as well
as the other mentioned behavioral responses represent level shifts rather
than growth shifts. Human capital cannot be inherited by the ospring. It
must be newly built by every generation. Likewise, labor force participation
rates of women cannot increase indenitely, a decline in youth dependency
eventually leads to an increase of old age dependency, and capital deepening
cannot lead to faster economic growth in the long run (cf. Solow, 1956).
According to the conventional wisdom derived from endogenous and semi-
endogenous growth theory (Romer, 1990; Aghion and Howitt, 1992; Jones,
1995; Segerstr om, 1998), this inevitably means that a declining eective
labor force must eventually lead to a slowdown of technological progress
and economic growth.
So why does the empirical literature have such a hard time identifying
a drag from declining fertility on economic growth? The natural conclusion
seems to be that one or several of the assumptions under which the pre-
diction has been generated do not hold. First, as shown by Dalgaard and
Kreiner (2003), the conventional wisdom is based upon the assumption of a
unit elasticity of substitution between technology and eective labor (which
follows from Cobb-Douglas aggregate production). With an elasticity above
one, a declining eective labor force could be replaced at an increasing rate
by new technology (meaning higher labor productivity) and the economy
could grow indenitely. This process would be propelled automatically via
the price mechanism (by the invisible hand) as humans and their human
capital become more scarce on earth and thus more precious.
Second, it may be misleading to obtain eective labor supply as the
simple compound hL. In particular, raw labor is presumably easier to sub-
stitute in the production of goods and R&D than human capital. This
view is empirically supported by the nding that the return to education is
19not constant but rising over time (see e.g. Cawley et al., 1998; Ashenfelter
et al., 1999). The return on education, with contrast to space on earth, hu-
man brains, and other physical entities, is a non-physical entity measured in
terms of value, which, in principle, could grow without bound. The growth
potential of an increasing return to education becomes immediately obvious
if one compares the value of the knowledge acquired through a completed
study of, say, today's medical science and that of a hundred years ago. If
the value of education continues to rise, our empirical results predict that,
eventually, a breakeven point is reached at which the quality eect overcom-
pensates the quantity eect. Assuming that human behavior stays constant,
that is, taking the data from Table 2, this breakeven point is reached when
the return to education  equals 1.11. This is admittedly a large value from
today's perspective. But no theoretical reasoning rules out the possibility
that it may, eventually, be reached and surpassed.
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20Appendix
A The Data
The data are obtained from the World Bank (2011)'s \World Development
Indicators & Global Development Finance" database and the \Education
Statistics" database. It covers 118 countries over the time frame 1980-2005
in ve years steps. The abbreviations for our variables are:
y: PPP adjusted per capita GDP in 2005 international Dollars
b: Crude birth rate per 1000 inhabitants
P: Life expectancy at birth
E: Mean years of schooling for the population at age 15+
L: Population size
Mean years of schooling data were available for the following coun-
tries: Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Austria, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Bel-
gium, Belize, Benin, Bolivia, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Cambodia,
Cameroon, Canada, Central African Republic, Chad, Chile, China, Colom-
bia, Comoros, Costa Rica, Cote d'Ivoire, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic,
Denmark, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Eritrea, Es-
tonia, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, France, Gabon, Germany, Ghana, Greece,
Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, India,
Indonesia, Iran, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Ko-
rea, Rep., Kyrgyz Republic, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Macedonia,
Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mau-
ritius, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Namibia, Nepal, Nether-
lands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan, Panama,
Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Russian Federa-
tion, Rwanda, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, South
Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, Swaziland, Sweden, Switzerland, Syrian Arab Re-
public, Tanzania, Thailand, Togo, Turkey, Turkmenistan, Uganda, Ukraine,
United Kingdom, United States, Uruguay, Uzbekistan, Vietnam and Zam-
bia.
21Other data also were available for Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Angola,
Antigua and Barbuda, Azerbaijan, Barbados, Belarus, Bhutan, Bosnia and
Herzegovina, Botswana, Brunei Darussalam, Burundi, Cape Verde, Congo,
Dem. Rep., Congo, Rep., Djibouti, Dominica, Equatorial Guinea, Gam-
bia, Georgia, Guinea-Bissau, Iceland, Israel, Jamaica, Kiribati, Kuwait,
Lao PDR, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libya, Moldova, Oman, Papua New
Guinea, Qatar, Senegal, Serbia, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Solomon Islands,
St. Kitts and Nevis, St. Lucia, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, Sudan,
Suriname, Tajikistan, Timor-Leste, Tonga, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia,
United Arab Emirates, Vanuatu, Venezuela and Yemen.
B Robustness Checks
This appendix contains the robustness checks. Tables 4 and 5 refer to
changes in the model specication as compared to equation (20). Table
6 contains the estimates for the sample split into OECD and non-OECD
countries. Finally, Table 7 reports the results of estimating equation (20) in
case of Bloom and Canning (2005)'s human capital specication with data
obtained from Barro and Lee (2010).
Note that case (1) computes human capital following the approach of
Bloom and Canning (2005), while case (2) follows Hall and Jones (1999).
Standard errors are reported in parenthesis. One asterisk indicates signif-
icance at the 10% level, two asterisks indicate signicance at the 5% level
and three asterisks indicate signicance at the 1% level.
22Table 4: Results for Dierent Model Specications following Bloom and
Canning (2005)
human capital (loght) according to benchmark (1)
loght loght loght loght




income (logyt 1) 0.059 0.033
(0.017)*** (0.017)*
pop. size (logLt 1) 0.118 0.115
(0.038)*** (0.036)***
R2 0.85 0.84 0.84 0.83
OBS 529 529 707 708
country fe yes yes yes yes
time fe yes yes yes yes
Estimates of equation (20). OBS refers to the number of observations.
Table 5: Results for Dierent Model Specications following Hall and Jones
(1999)
human capital (loght) according to benchmark (2)
loght loght loght loght




income (logyt 1) 0.030 0.015
(0.020) (0.017)
pop. size (logLt 1) 0.112 0.151
(0.056)** (0.038)***
R2 0.76 0.76 0.80 0.78
OBS 626 627 848 848
country fe yes yes yes yes
time fe yes yes yes yes
Estimates of equation (20). OBS refers to the number of observations.
23Table 6: Results for Sample Split into OECD and non-OECD countries
human capital (loght) human capital (loght)
(1) (2)
OECD non-OECD OECD non-OECD
fertility (logbt) -0.047 -0.135 -0.152 -0.255
(0.046) (0.053)** (0.064)** (0.073)***
income (logyt 1) 0.102 0.033 0.034 0.014
(0.042)** (0.017)* (0.063) (0.019)
pop. size (logLt 1) 0.129 0.072 -0.117 0.112
(0.097) (0.050) (0.146) (0.061)*
R2 0.92 0.83 0.78 0.76
OBS 149 380 163 464
country fe yes yes yes yes
time fe yes yes yes yes
Estimates of equation (20). OBS refers to the number of observations.
Table 7: Robustness Check with respect to Barro and Lee (2010) Data
human capital (loght)











Estimates of equation (20). OBS refers to the number of observations.
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